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WHOSE RIGHTS ARE THESE ANYWAY? - A RETHINKING
OF OUR SOCIETY'S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS IN
ORDER TO BETTER PROTECT NATIVE AMERICAN
RELIGIOUS PROPERTY
Suzanne Milchan*
I. Overview of Topic
In 1999, outrage among the Zia Pueblo peoples within New Mexico
escalated over pervasive and unauthorized usage of their religious symbol, an
image of a red circle and lines extending outward in four different direc-
tions - the Zia Sun.' This sacred symbol appeared on "snacks, [shirts],
buildings and businesses," and, what would be considered sacrilege to the
most devout Christian, public toilets.2 The appropriation of the Zia Sun
appeared to be permissible because the image appeared on the flag of New
Mexico.
In 1994, the Church of Scientology sued a group of former adherents who
stole coveted scriptures used by the Church to bring in followers.3 Those
members of the Church who gave of themselves financially would gain access
to the scriptures. The Church sued under trade secret protection, alleging that
the scriptures were valid intellectual property used for proprietary interests.
Citing Religious Technology Center v. Scott, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that the Church must prove some "actual
economic advantage over competitors" as well as the existence of the other
trade secret elements.4 On remand, the federal district court did not arrive at
the issue of whether protectable trade secrets even existed in this particular
case.
5
There is manifest unfairness in the resolution of both cases. On one side,
a resolution of the Church of Scientology case allows a broad application of
* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. Leslie Linthicum, Zia Symbol Sparks Ownership Questions, ALBUQUERQUE J., July 9,
1999, at Al.
2. Julie Cart, National Perspective American Album: A Culture Clash of Symbolism,
Commercialism, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 1999, at A5, available at 1999 WL 2177725.
3. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Scott, 869 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1989).
4. Church of Scientology Int'l v. Fishman, No. 91 Civ. 6426, 1994 WL 467999, at 3 (9th
Ci. Aug. 30, 1994).
5. Id.
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intellectual property to organized religious expression. However, this
application arguably rewards questionable religious practices in which the
religious development of the Church's members becomes inseparable from the
financial interests of the church. In the situation involving the Zia Sun, the
interested parties seek protection for their most fundamental and sacred
symbol; though the protection for other like symbols has increased over the
last couple of years, the policies implemented have met with controversy.6
Some legal scholars offer criticisms concerning the application of
intellectual property laws to protect indigenous peoples' cultural property, and
in particular, religious property, opting instead, for a "traditional resource
rights system."7 This note explores the numerous problems underlying the
misappropriation of Native American symbols, particularly religious art and
symbols. In reference to these problems, this note further argues that in order
to provide some legal defense to these symbols, it is necessary to look into the
protections offered under three intellectual property schemes which could
provide the appropriate protection for Native.American religious emblems and
examine the discussions regarding these doctrines. This note first discusses
the relationship between Native American peoples and Native American
cultural and religious property as signifiers of cultural identity and
connectedness between the people and the land. Second, this note provides
a comment on current United States intellectual property policy and the
differences between Western and non-Western conceptions of United States
intellectual property policy. Third, and finally, this note discusses the
relevant intellectual property doctrines and whether any of these doctrines
should be rethought if they are to be applied to Indian religious art, rituals or
symbols. It is necessary to support a combination of the utilitarian, Western
model of intellectual property theory and the European intellectual property
model, which focuses on morality rights to protect both the author's use of the
6. Christine L. Satory & Joey Doty, Smoked Signals, PRINT: AM. GRAPHmc DESIGN MAG.,
Jan. 1,2000, available at 2000 WL 17669714 (discussing the graphic design trade's frustration
with the Patent and Trademark Office's policing of potential infringement of Native American
religious and cultural art through submissions for trademark protection).
7. DARRELL A. POSEY & GRAHAM DUTFIELD, BEYOND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: TOwARD
TRADITIONAL RESOURCE RIGHTS FOR INDIANS 80, 92 (1996). See generally Alfred Yen,
Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990).
Yen writes that the inclusion of natural law into our copyright regimes will correct the already
present shortcomings inherent in our copyright regime such as our regime's current misplaced
reliance on economic incentives. Id. at 557. Professor Yen goes on to state that a regime





thing and the author herself. Furthermore, it is necessary to develop a system
that accounts for the differentials between our society and the structure and
system of Native American tribes and development of cultural symbols,
illuminating issues that our current system of intellectual property laws cannot
sufficiently safeguard.
II. The Relationship Between Native American Tribes and Native American
Intellectual Property
Native American religious intellectual property faces problems with
protection from the Western intellectual property regimes. Our society's
continued misuse, or misappropriation of Native American culture constitutes
a cultural "poaching" of indigenous culture or property.8 The notion of
existence for indigenous cultures possesses an intimate relationship with the
land, their spiritual existence, and their identity as a people.9 The art, and
particularly, the stories, of indigenous peoples - much of which is religious
in nature - represent "the bedrock of cultural survival" for Native Americans
because they contain the philosophical core of tribal cultures, including the
norms and values that structure tribal world views.l° We preserve intellectual
property of the Native Americans; thus, we preserve their culture and
existence.
A. The Terminology of Native American Intellectual Property Discourse
Any discussion concerning the misappropriation of cultural and religious
property should start by defining the terminology most commonly associated
with this discourse. Many legal scholars have used the definition of cultural
property as a starting point in which to place into context a discussion of
Native American's rights in property." These definitions fall within a
culturalist trap; it emphasizes the language and meanings of one culture and
does not contemplate the language and meanings inherent in another culture. 2
8. Christine Haight Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual
Property the Answer?, 30 CONN. L. REv. 1, 11 (1997).
9. Id.
10. Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine:
Cultural Sovereignty and the Collective Future of Indian Nations, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
191,203 (2001).
11. See generally Richard Guest, Intellectual Property Rights and Native American Tribes,
20 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 111 (1995-96); James D. Nason, Traditional Property and Modem
Laws: The Needfor Native American Community Intellectual Property Rights Legislation, 12
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 255 (2001).
12. Kristin Ann Mattiske, Recognition of Indigenous Heritage in the Modem World: U.S.
No. 1]
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James D. Nason discusses the importance in developing Native American
intellectual property legislation, characterizing the terminology of cultural
property as "all of the tangible materials . . . tangible forms of culture
produced by humans to adapt to and exercise control over their environ-
ment . . .the technological and other associated knowledge considered
significant by the members of a culture."'3 Nason continues his discussion by
further emphasizing the correlation between cultural property and Native
American identity: "[t]his notion that a people's identity as a sovereign group
could be represented by tangible cultural property, and demoralized or
destroyed by the removal of such property, continues to be an important
ideological and property concept today."' 4 A more simplified conception of
cultural property might be characterized as "historical, archaeological, and
ethnographical objects, works of art, and architecture that embody a culture." 5
Once we determine that cultural property is the focus of the discussion
centered on the development of intellectual property community rights for
Native Americans, the discussion should turn to the issue of Native American
religious property and whether Western ideologies concerning copyrights can
accommodate them.
Certainly, our society has already legislated measures meant, in substantial
part, to offer protection for Native Americans. The religious beliefs of the
Native Americans are intimately bound together with the ideology of cultural
property; "Indigenous peoples regard all products of the human mind and
heart as interrelated, and as flowing from the same source: the relationships
between the people and their land, their kinship with the other living creatures
that share the land, and with the spirit world."' 6 The relationship between the
geography of their lands and their religious beliefs is fundamental to Native
American religious worship, exemplified by specific religious sites used in
ceremonies and other religious practices. 7 The correlation between nature
and religion for Native Americans is classic; "[a]mong indigenous peoples
who choose to continue close physical, social, and emotional relationships
Legal Protection in Light of International Custom, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1105, 1109 (2002).
13. Nason, supra, note 11, at 256.
14. Id.
15. Guest, supra note 11, at 114.
16. ERICA-IRENE DAES, PROTECTION OF THE HERITAGE OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE, 1 5, U.N.
Sales No. E.97.XIV.3 (1997).
17. Jack F. Trope, Protecting Native American Religious Freedom: The Legal, Historical,
and Constitutional Basis for the Proposed Native American Free Exercise of Religion Act, 20




with their ancestral landscapes, the land creates a universe of shared
meanings."' 8
In addition to the development of these concepts, it becomes increasingly
clear that further development of the term "appropriation" is needed; it is
within the territory of this word that the entire struggle between the Western
ideology and Native American property exists. Rebecca Tsosie uses Lenore
Keeshig-Tobias's definition of cultural appropriation in her essay: it
constitutes a "taking, from a culture that is not one's own, intellectual
property, cultural expressions and artifacts, history and ways of knowledge." 9
The taking does not have to refer simply to one type of property; tangible or
intangible property each have the potential to be appropriated by another
culture. 0 Mainstream society has helped itself to Native American culture for
entertainment and practical matters: our appropriation of indigenous
medicines, school and sport club's mascots and cultural and religious symbols
reflects the influence that Native Americans have had on our entertainment
and benefit. Their appropriation further exemplifies the history percolating
beneath the current ideology - that the Native Americans "were to be
'civilized,' assimilated, and acculturated into American society."'" Thus,
mainstream's exertion of power over the indigenous cultures of North
America typify the struggle between both cultures.22 Rebecca Tsosie
acknowledges that the misappropriation of Native American culture by society
is particularly harmful to the preservation of Native American culture.23
Although Tsosie' s article focuses on the development of native sovereignty,
it is not wholly outside its context to apply the ideas proffered to the
relationship between our intellectual property laws and Native American
culture and religion. "[T]he conflicts between Native people and Europeans
have always had a cultural as well as a political dimension."'24 Therefore, to
take control over a people's things and property is, in effect, to have control
over themselves.
18. Russel L. Barsh, Grounded Visions: Native American Conceptions of Landscapes and
Ceremony, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 127, 129 (2000).
19. Rebecca Tsosie, Reclaiming Native Stories: An Essay on Cultural Appropriation and
Cultural Rights, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 299, 300 (2002).
20. Id.
21. Louis Fisher, Indian Religious Freedom: To Litigate or Legislate?, 26 AM. INDIAN L.
REv. 1, 1 (2001).
22. See Tsosie, supra note 19, at 299-300.
23. See generally Tsosie, supra note 19.
24. Id. at 306.
No. 1]
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B. Native Americans Religious Property as Cultural Property
The struggle of maintenance of the Native American identity is intimately
linked to the property owned by Native Americans, their medicines, their
religious arts and symbols, their stories and music.25 Despite attempts by the
United States to legislate protection his relationship between cultural identity
and property is foreign to Western societies:
[M]any non-Indian people treat culture as an abstract concept,
something that can be easily separated from everyday life. [N]on-
Indians consider tribal sovereignty as yet another feature of
America's "multicultural tradition." That is, they tolerate the
distinctive status of Indian nations up to the point that this would
appear to give them rights in excess of those enjoyed by other
citizens. ... [and] essentially holds all citizens to the same set of
constitutional freedoms and protections.26
Once this phenomenon takes place, it becomes harder to justify arguments
supporting an increase in rights for one specific group, because our society
unnecessarily conflates ourselves and our rights with those needed by
different peoples.27 Thus, if our society is to rectify the current intellectual
property system to protect the culture of Native Americans, it will be
necessary to broaden the scope of our law; only in this manner can they
effectively protect Native American religious property.
IlL. A Critique of Current U.S. Intellectual Property Laws and Policy from
the Non-Western Perspective
Intellectual property laws demonstrate the importance our society places on
the rights of the author or creator to use their intellectual property within the
proper legal framework. Typically, our current intellectual property laws
25. See generally Gelvina Rodriguez Stevenson, Trade Secrets: The Secret to Protecting
Indigenous Ethnobiological (Medicinal) Knowledge, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 1119 (2000)
(discussing the need for trade secret protection for indigenous peoples' ethnobiological
medicines); see also Justin G. Blankenship, The Cancellation of Redskins as a Disparaging
Trademark: Is Federal Trademark Law an Appropriate Solution for Words that Offend?, 72
U. CoLO. L. REV. 415 (2001) (discussing the ability of trademark laws to prevent mainstream
society's use of disparaging words toward Native Americans for entertainment value).
Blakenship cites Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999), which held
that evidence presented by the petitioners demonstrated by apreponderance of the evidence, that
the word "redskin(s)" could be disparaging toward those of American Indian decent.




protect those things produced from the ideas of individuals.28 Authors and
inventors must be aware of the duration of protection for their creations;
furthermore, those same authors and creators must also be aware that
intellectual property laws impart a limited monopoly upon them.29 This
Western-oriented idea of owning a monopoly in a song, in a symbol, in any
religious property, is antithetical to Native American culture and to their
conception of what property means to them and their existence. Indeed, our
own idealization of a democracy as the model sociopolitical structure would
not harmonize with monopolies, and particularly, monopolies on ideas.3' Yet,
our society holds dear the "dominant view of intellectual property rights...
economic incentive theory.".32 The different areas of intellectual property
protection imparts a limited monopoly upon the author and creator, thus
maximizing their protection of the economic investment of the work.33 Such
protection allows "[tihe economic philosophy behind the clause empowering
Congress to grant patents and copyrights ... the conviction that encourage-
ment of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare .... In his article, "Square Pegs and Round Holes," David Jordan
attempts to resolve the conflict between domestic intellectual property laws
and Native American conceptions of cultural property.35 Jordan explains the
struggle of the Chilkat Indians for their "Whale House" artifacts, valued
among the tribe for their cultural value rather than their economic value. 36 His
article lends truth to the notion that "[miost intellectual property law models
are based on Western, capitalist philosophy, and indeed appear to be
developed with such a world view in mind."37 Hence, our society would
28. DONALD A. GREGORY ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 2
(1994).
29. KINNEY &LANGE, P.A., INTELLECUALPROPERTY LAW FOR BUSINESS LAWYERS § 1.1,
at 1-4 (1996).
30. See generally Barsh, supra note 18 (discussing the meanings and spirit of Native
American religion); David B. Jordan, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Domestic Intellectual
Property Law and Native American Economic and Cultural Policy: Can it Fit?, 25 AM. INDIAN
L. REv. 93 (2000-01) (discussing the inability of U.S. copyright laws to offer substantial
protection for Native American intellectual and cultural property).
31. KINNEY & LANGE, P.A., supra note 29, at 1.
32. Id. at 4.
33. Id.
34. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
35. Jordan, supra note 30.
36. Id. at 95.
37. Doris Estelle Long, The Impact of Foreign Investment on Indigenous Culture: An
Intellectual Property Perspective, 23 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 229, 246 (1998).
No. 1] NOTES
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expect some sort of economic compensation for the author or inventor of these
devices, a reward system that holds no inherent value to Native American
cultures.38 Although the United State's copyright doctrines are structured to
apply in different ways to different products and processes, they can be boiled
down to their most basic foundation: protecting the economic incentives of the
authors and inventors to create, write and produce.39 As a result,
contemporary intellectual property laws function within a free market
paradigm, presenting many inadequacies with application to cultural and
religious symbols.
IV. Relevant Doctrines in Intellectual Property and Rethinking the Current
Paradigms
The increasing importance of intellectual property in our expanding global
market economy has been a much-discussed issue between legal scholars and
law review articles.4" However, little U.S. policy and legislation enacted for
the benefit of Native American cultural and religious property has been
effective in reaching their objectives.4' Before discussing contemporary
intellectual property theories and their relationship to Native American
cultural and religious property, it is important to consider the applicable
doctrines of intellectual property law. Each area of intellectual property -
trademark, copyright, and trade secret - can be seen as a separate and distinct
subject, potentially applicable to any and all categories of Native American
cultural and religious property.
A. Western Intellectual Property Doctrines
Trademark law is normally associated with images of Western
commercialism, notably your Coca-Cola can and Mickey Mouse. However,
this area of intellectual property has recently joined the discourse focusing on
Native American intellectual property rights.42 Trademark law offers
protection of identifying marks, words, symbols, or images either "used by a
person, or [ ] which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and
[ ] to identify and distinguish his or her goods.... and to indicate the source
of the goods, ... even if that source is unknown."43 Certainly, one could draw
38. Jordan, supra note 30, at 97.
39. See generally Long, supra note 37.
40. See generally Stevenson, supra note 25.
41. See Jordan, supra note 30, at 114.
42. See generally Blankenship, supra note 25.




between the Zia Pueblo peoples and Suzan Shown Harjo and the Native
Americans who brought the Washington Redskins in front of Justice Walters
in 1999." In the latter case, the administrative trademark judge found that:
"[the] petitioners . . . clearly established ... the word 'redskin(s),' as it
appears in respondent's marks in those registrations and as used in connection
with the identified services, may disparage Native Americans, as perceived by
a substantial composite of Native Americans."45
Similar analysis might be applied to the problem that the Zia Pueblo people
faced in 1999.46 In regard to the former situation, the Zia Sun is commonly
used throughout New Mexico as a symbolic representation of the state, and
has been seen on practically everything.47 Indeed, the Zia Sun permeated
mainstream New Mexican culture: "Zia, the name given the sun symbol found
on the state flag and a staggering variety of snacks, T-shirts, buildings and
businesses. Across the state the Zia name and symbol are affixed to
companies offering pest control, plumbing, window cleaning and security
services."48
The situation in both cases is similar; a Native American symbol is
appropriated in some manner to entertain and engage in commercial
transactions - i.e., football games, t-shirts, or food products.49 The
connotation arising from the association between our society's consumptive
needs and these representations of Native American culture is that Native
American culture can and will be reduced to the lowest denomination possible
within our own culture. 0
Backlash against Patent and Trademark Office's standards of protectionfor
Native American religious and cultural property arose in light of Harjo and the
Zia Sun situation. The controversy surrounds the office's current
methodology of protection of Indian religious art and symbols.5' The
controversy encompasses certain trade specialists in the field of graphic and
multimedia designs. 2 These specialists and experts are concerned with
566 (2000).
44. Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999), reprinted in MERGES
ET AL., supra note 43, at 642-48.
45. MERGES ET AL., supra note 43, at 647.
46. Cart, supra note 2.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.; see Hajo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999)
50. Cart, supra note 2.
51. See generally Satory & Doty, supra note 6.
52. Id.
No. 1]
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overbroad protection of anything that is perceptively related to Indian
religion.53 However, in supporting this agenda, the arguments of these critics
fall into a reductionist trap; rather than focusing on the mistakes of the Patent
and Trademark Office in policing these new policies, the criticisms focus on
the tribes themselves and their attorneys. 4 "There are many reasons not to
change the Patent and Trademark laws. Consider the precedent that would be
set for non-Indian cultures and ethnic groups seeking the same extraordinary
trademark protection," the article states. 5 Such a statement ignores the
foundation behind the push for extended protection of Native American
religious property; rather, the graphic design trade advocates represent those
perceptions traditionally protected by our current intellectual property laws.56
Western regimes of copyright law protect the author's monopoly from his
or her works, or works created by a collective process.57 The works protected
under such a scheme require only originality and fixation of the work within
a tangible medium.5" The problems created by the potential applications of
the statutory definition of copyrightable works to Native American religious
or cultural works is two-fold. First, originality is seen as "independent
creation of a work featuring a modicum of creativity."59 Second, the Western
tradition of author is generally understood to mean an individual working in
his or her own capacity, or other alternative such as seen in "joint works,
works made for hire, collective works [seen in compilations, collections, or
journals] and the transfer of rights."'6 In a broader sense, copyright law
provides a legal vehicle to "determine[] ownership of creative content and
thus grants copyright owners authority to regulate how and under what terms
protected information is sold, bought, used, and otherwise transmitted.
' 6 1
Neither of these perspectives properly conforms neatly to the Native American
conception of religious property; indeed, "[t]he American copyright system




56. See generally Jordan, supra note 30.
57. MERGES ET AL., supra note 43, at 348.
58. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
59. MERGES ET AL., supra note 43, at 354.
60. Jordan, supra note 30, at 98.
61. Ruth Gana Okediji, Copyright and Public Welfare in Global Perspective, 7 IND. J.




of any actual original author, or alternatively, the requisite intent to enter into
... joint or collective works.62
Conflicts arise between what those copyright laws protect and how Native
American cultural and religious expressions are created.63 Western copyright
paradigms assume a single "author" of a work, an author that is identifiable
and "who has generated something original, distinctive, or nonobvious. ' 61
Furthermore, the scope of our current copyright laws are limited solely to the
author's lifetime; this factor is problematic because many times, the author of
cultural religious art, symbols, stories, or songs is unknown or cannot be
limited to a single identity.65 Finally, the Western perception of copyrightable
works translates into limited monopolies enjoyed by the author or authors of
the works. 6  A tremendous portion of the importance that intellectual property
laws would hold for Native American groups rests in their ability to protect
and preserve "the expressions of their cultural identity and the embodiments
of their indigenous heritage., 67 The major issue facing the potential for
copyright laws to accommodate the works of indigenous peoples is the ability
of the laws to compensate for these substantial differences.
Though it is an area statutorily created to protect the economic interests of
groups, trade secret law offers some usefulness as a safeguard to protect
certain aspects of Native American cultural property. Trade secret is typically
designed to protect works that must be kept a secret and that have some
economic value.6' The statutory definition of trade secret follows below:
• . . information, including a formula, pattern, compilation,
program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from
not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable
by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 9
62. Jordan, supra note 30, at 99.
63. Lucy M. Moran, Intellectual Property Law Protection for Traditional and Sacred
"Folklife Expressions", 6 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 99, 102 (1998).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 103.
66. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
67. Guest, supra note 11, at 113.
68. MERGES ET AL., supra note 43, at 24-25.
69. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3426.1 (1979).
No. 1]
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Trade secrets have been widely discussed as providing viable means to protect
the ethnobiological medicines and remedies of indigenous peoples.7° Indeed,
the doctrine may also be considered when conceptualizing the struggle
between the case law involving the Church of Scientology, illustrated above
in "Overview of Topic," and the situation involving the Zia Pueblo peoples
and the Zia Sun.
B. Rethinking the Current Paradigms
New approaches to instrument the protection of Native American religious
property should be developed, or at least contemplated, to facilitate the
protection of Indian religious property. Within the last half of the century, the
United States has emerged as the leading nation "to develop a comprehensive
legislative scheme for the protection of the cultural heritage of [this country's]
indigenous peoples."'"
While there is some substantial necessity to rework current intellectual
property schemes in order to accommodate protection of Native American
religious art and symbols, the Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act, or NAGPRA," was seen as the integral step taken in 1990
by Congress to "formally recogniz[e] the Native American culture as unique,"
and particularly in need of special protection by the laws of the United States
government.73 The purpose behind the statute was "to correct past abuses,
guarantee protection for, the human remains and cultural objects of Native
American tribal culture."74 The statute applies to cultural items of Native
American peoples, which it defines as "human remains", "associated funerary
objects," "unassociated funerary objects," "sacred objects," and "cultural
patrimony."7 "
Three federal court cases have arisen under NAGPRA, with the parties
claiming that NAGPRA stood in violation of the Constitution of the United
70. See generally Stevenson, supra note 25 (discussing trade secret protection in relation
to indigenous ethnobiological medicines).
71. Mattiske, supra note 12, at 1107.
72. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (2000).
73. Mattiske, supra note 12, at 1128.
74. Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Applicability of Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (25 U.S.C.A. §§ 3001-3013 and 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1170), 173 A.L.R. FED. 585 (2001).




States.76 United States v. Tidwel177 and United States v. Corrow78 both held
the statute is "not unconstitutionally void for vagueness., 79 Furthermore,
NAGPRA has not been found yet to violate the Fourteenth Amendment "right
of equal protection of the law8"" in the case of Bonnichsen v. United States
Department of Army.8'
However, the law has come under criticism by some legal scholars as being
"underinclusive in its application... [because] [n]on-federal institutions such
as art auction houses, dealers and private collectors are not bound by the
Act."82  Thus, while the statute is effective as a protective measure for
"culturally significant" items that "are currently held and controlled by federal
agencies and museums," it does not, and possibly cannot, cover all those
institutions - auctions, dealers, and collectors that contain some form of
Native American religious property. 3
A new way to re-conceptualize Native American religious property is by
combining the United States' view of intellectual property law as something
granting monopolies and protecting economic incentives with the European
model of natural, or moral, rights.' 4 Though the terminology typically refers
to copyrightable works, the general principals supporting moral/natural rights
could potentially be applied to all areas of intellectual property, becoming
particularly relevant when discussing Native American religious property.
Moral rights are generally composed of divulgation,86 paternity 87 and
76. Buckman, supra note 74, § 3.
77. 191 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 1999).
78. 119 F.3d 796 (10th Cir. 1997).
79. Buckman, supra note 74, § 3.
80. Id. § 4.
81. 969 F. Supp. 628 (D. Or. 1997).
82. Mattiske, supra note 12, at 1131; see also Kate Morris, Strategies and Procedures for
the Repatriation of Materials from the Private Sector, http://www.repatriationfoundation.org/
strat.html (accessed Jan. 20, 2003).
83. Mattiske, supra note 12, at 1129-30.
84. JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 12(2002).
This text discusses natural, or moral rights, in regard to copyright law. For a general discussion
of the moral rights doctrine, see Yen, supra note 7.
85. Paul Kuruk, Protecting Forlklore Under Modem Intellectual Property Regimes: A
Reappraisal of the Tensions Between Individual and CommunalRights in Africa and the United
States, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 769, 846 (1999). Kuruk discusses "the proposal in Australia [ I to
draw a distinction between the customary user [ ] and traditional owner, [ ] of Aboriginal
folklore as a way of tackling the tensions between the concepts of ownership inherent in modem
intellectual property laws and traditional rights." Id.
86. Divulgation allows an author to "release work from [the] private sphere and to expose
it to the public." Id. The idea of moral rights is not necessarily foreign to this country.
No. 1]
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integrity." These rights are said to be granted generally because there is a
moral component to them; essentially, it is wrong, in and of itself, to take, to
misappropriate the work. 9 The rights within the moral right construct "inhere
in and protect the personality of the author [or authors]." 9° Furthermore, while
traditional modes of copyright law offer only limited duration of protection,9'
the application of a moral rights system to indigenous peoples' religious
property would require an extension of the term for protection because "the
community's interest in the work, [rather than] the reputation of the artist with
which they are concerned."92
Frederick Hart, who won renown for his "Three Soldiers" bronze statute displayed at the
Vietnam Veterans Memorial, spent a painstaking thirteen years designing the "Ex Nihilo, the
Creation of Mankind out of nothing, as Narrated in the Book of Genesis," now on display at the
National Cathedral in Washington D.C. (After completing the sculpture, he converted to
Catholicism.) Warner Bros. spent a couple of days desecrating the message behind the
sculpture, using it as an erotic depiction of hell featured in the Devil's apartment in "Devil's
Advocate." Due to the problems that this depiction created for the artist and the cathedral, a
judge ordered a two-day delay on the release of "Devil's Advocate" to videotape. Four days
later, a settlement agreement was reached between the parties wherein Warner Bros. would
attach disclaimers on the videocassettes stating there was no relationship or endorsement
between Hart and the cathedral to use the sculpture, and that the studio agreed to make changes
to certain portions of the film to eliminate any perceived confusion in future distribution of the
movie. The studio was also required to edit approximately twenty minutes of the film, in which
the sculpture would be visible to the audience. The studio digitally removed the images of the
people from the sculpture on the final cable and video versions. This represents, in particular,
one instance where a party confessed to their wrongdoing, where it exceeded infringement and
it went more toward the author's integrity and the sculpture's integrity. Copyright Casebook -
"Devil's Advocate" - Warner Bros. and Frederick Hart, http://www.benedict.com/visual/
devil/devil.asp (last visited Jan. 20, 2003).
87. Paternity, under a moral right structure, "invests in the author the right to claim
authorship of the work." Jordan, supra note 30, at 112.
88. Integrity "allows an author 'to object to any distortion, mutilation of, or other
derogatory action in relation to, the . . . work which would be prejudicial to honor or
reputation."' Jordan, supra note 30, at 112 (citing Paris Text to the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 6 bis., S. Treaty Doc. No. 27, 99th Cong. 37
(1986)).
89. COHEN ET AL., supra note 84, at 13.
90. Farley, supra note 8, at 48.
91. The duration for a copyright is the author's lifetime plus seventy years; works-for-hire
have a ninety-five-year minimum after publication of the work, or 120 years after the creation
of the work. Trade secret enjoys a period of protection until it is publicly disclosed. Patents
enjoy a protection period of twenty-five years from filing, with possible extensions of up to five
years for ethnobiological medicines. Trademarks/dress have a perpetual period of protection,
so long as the mark, symbol, etc. does not fall into disuse. MERGES ET AL., supra note 43, at 25.




However, the Constitution of the United States expressly limits the extent
to which protection may be afforded protection for copyright work extends
only for "limited [t]imes"'93 and because, in the traditional sense, moral rights
protect from the mutilation or destruction of the underlying work, an infusion
of moral rights into the intellectual property infrastructure of the United States
interferes with the constitutional protections for both the public domain and
an individual's freedom of expression. Thus, it would be reasonable for our
system of intellectual property laws to employ a modified duration specifically
geared to Native American religious property, under the same justifications
employed by legislative mandates such as NAGPRA.94 For copyrightable,
even patentable, religious property, Lucy M. Moran suggests that for
"regenerated folklife expressions as falling within the copyright category of
'derived work' at the end of a statutorily defined time period, such as 100
years, automatically registered to a 'new' author, [which are] the several
subsequent generations of a regenerated folk community."95  Religious
property that might be able to enjoy trademark protection without fear of
violating the constitutional limits against perpetuity would, presumably, need
not worry about modifications of the statutory time limits as long as there was
careful monitoring among the indigenous community to ensure the mark, sign,
or word does not fall into misuse or disuse.96 Finally, a moral rights
infrastructure would help ensure that tribes gain access to some degree of
intellectual property rights, as well as allow tribes themselves, the right to
preserve the integrity of their works, such as the sculptor Frederick Hart was
allowed to do, by giving them the opportunity to withdraw their work from the
public sphere if their works are being abused.97
V. Conclusion
If we ever hope that our intellectual property laws are changed to meet the
needs for protecting Native American religious property, society must first
come to some understanding of the cultural differences between the dominant
culture and the indigenous cultures that share in our land. Currently, it is
difficult for our society to fathom the intimacy with which our identities can
be linked to intellectual property. As we enter a new century with a new hope
of reaching a multicultural understanding with different peoples of different
93. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
94. Moran, supra note 63, at 115.
95. Id.
96. MERGES ET AL., supra note 43, at 559.
97. Jordan, supra note 30, at 112.
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ethnicities, we should only hope that our minds can understand the differences
between the cultures. Only then can society, and our laws, truly change.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol28/iss1/5
